Evaluating Seasonal Strategies
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Incorporating margin into a basic analysis of rate-of-return results in the following formula for the above British Pound strategy:
This computation takes into account the relationship between the strategy's
historical profit, current margin, and length of exposure. To illustrate the
point, if we compare an S&P 500 strategy with the same historical average profit
but with an initial margin of $21,563, the value would be approximately 41%.
Stated another way, historical average profits of $22,331 would be required to
get the same rate of return on margin
Consistency
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| British Pound(IMM)-December | ||||||||||
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| Buy on approximately 08/17 - Exit on approximately 10/14 | Contract Size: 62,500 British Pounds | |||||||||
Cont Year |
Buy Date |
Buy Price |
Exit Date |
Exit Price |
Profit |
Profit Amount |
Best Equity Date |
Best Equity Amount |
Worst Equity Date |
Worst Equity Amount |
| 2000 | 08/17/00 | 150.26 | 10/13/00 | 145.36 | -4.90 | -3062.50 | 09/15/00 | -6337.50 | ||
| 1999 | 08/17/99 | 160.58 | 10/14/99 | 166.46 | 5.88 | 3675.00 | 10/14/99 | 3675.00 | 08/25/99 | -1175.00 |
| 1998 | 08/17/98 | 160.56 | 10/14/98 | 169.96 | 9.40 | 5875.00 | 10/08/98 | 6225.00 | ||
| 1997 | 08/18/97 | 160.38 | 10/14/97 | 161.68 | 1.30 | 812.50 | 09/25/97 | 1187.50 | 09/04/97 | -1712.50 |
| 1996 | 08/19/96 | 154.34 | 10/14/96 | 157.98 | 3.64 | 2275.00 | 10/14/96 | 2275.00 | ||
| 1995 | 08/17/95 | 154.48 | 10/13/95 | 157.14 | 2.66 | 1662.50 | 09/21/95 | 3112.50 | 08/22/95 | -950.00 |
| 1994 | 08/17/94 | 153.90 | 10/14/94 | 159.30 | 5.40 | 3375.00 | 10/14/94 | 3375.00 | 08/26/94 | -650.00 |
| 1993 | 08/17/93 | 147.64 | 10/14/93 | 150.90 | 3.26 | 2037.50 | 09/10/93 | 4112.50 | 08/25/93 | -375.00 |
| 1992 | 08/17/92 | 188.34 | 10/14/92 | 169.08 | -19.26 | -12037.50 | 09/08/92 | 5337.50 | 10/08/92 | -13775.00 |
| 1991 | 08/19/91 | 159.92 | 10/14/91 | 169.84 | 9.92 | 6200.00 | 10/03/91 | 8475.00 | ||
| 1990 | 08/17/90 | 188.36 | 10/12/90 | 194.94 | 6.58 | 4112.50 | 10/11/90 | 4837.50 | 09/21/90 | -4225.00 |
| 1989 | 08/17/89 | 153.64 | 10/13/89 | 155.14 | 1.50 | 937.50 | 09/26/89 | 4187.50 | 09/05/89 | -1287.50 |
| 1988 | 08/17/88 | 167.66 | 10/14/88 | 174.84 | 7.18 | 4487.50 | 10/14/88 | 4487.50 | 09/01/88 | -1687.50 |
| 1987 | 08/17/87 | 157.90 | 10/14/87 | 165.35 | 7.45 | 4656.25 | 10/14/87 | 4656.25 | ||
| 1986 | 08/18/86 | 147.20 | 10/14/86 | 142.50 | -4.70 | -2937.50 | 08/20/86 | 937.50 | 10/08/86 | -3843.75 |
| Percentage Correct | 80 | |||||||||
| Average Profit on Winning Trades | 5.35 | 3342.19 | Winners | 12 | ||||||
| Average Loss on Trades | -9.62 | -6012.50 | Losers | 3 | ||||||
| Average Net Profit Per Trade | 2.35 | 1471.25 | Total trades | 15 | ||||||
SEASONAL TENDENCIES ARE A COMPOSITE OF SOME OF THE MORE CONSISTENT COMMODITY FUTURES SEASONALS THAT
HAVE OCCURRED OVER THE PAST 15 YEARS. THERE ARE USUALLY UNDERLYING FUNDAMENTAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT
OCCUR ANNUALLY THAT TEND TO CAUSE THE FUTURES MARKETS TO REACT IN A SIMILAR DIRECTIONAL MANNER
DURING A CERTAIN CALENDAR PERIOD OF THE YEAR. EVEN IF A SEASONAL TENDENCY OCCURS IN THE FUTURE, IT
MAY NOT RESULT IN A PROFITABLE TRANSACTION AS FEES, AND THE TIMING OF THE ENTRY AND LIQUIDATION MAY
IMPACT ON THE RESULTS. NO REPRESENTATION IS BEING MADE THAT ANY ACCOUNT HAS IN THE PAST OR WILL IN
THE FUTURE ACHIEVE PROFITS UTILIZING THESE STRATEGIES. NO REPRESENTATION IS BEING MADE THAT
PRICE PATTERNS WILL RECUR IN THE FUTURE.
HYPOTHETICAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS HAVE MANY INHERENT LIMITATIONS,
SOME OF WHICH ARE DESCRIBED BELOW. NO REPRESENTATION IS BEING MADE
THAT ANY ACCOUNT WILL OR IS LIKELY TO ACHIEVE PROFITS OR LOSSES SIMILAR
TO THOSE SHOWN. IN FACT, THERE ARE FREQUENTLY SHARP DIFFERENCES BETWEEN
HYPOTHETICAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS AND THE ACTUAL RESULTS SUBSEQUENTLY
ACHIEVED BY ANY PARTICULAR TRADING PROGRAM. ONE OF THE LIMITATIONS
OF HYPOTHETICAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS IS THAT THEY ARE GENERALLY
PREPARED WITH THE BENEFIT OF HINDSIGHT. IN ADDITION, HYPOTHETICAL
TRADING DOES NOT INVOLVE FINANCIAL RISK, AND NO HYPOTHETICAL TRADING RECORD
CAN COMPLETELY ACCOUNT FOR THE IMPACT OF FINANCIAL RISK IN ACTUAL TRADING.
FOR EXAMPLE, THE ABILITY TO WITHSTAND LOSSES OR ADHERE TO A PARTICULAR TRADING
PROGRAM IN SPITE OF TRADING LOSSES ARE MATERIAL POINTS WHICH CAN ALSO ADVERSELY
AFFECT ACTUAL TRADING RESULTS. THERE ARE NUMEROUS OTHER FACTORS RELATED TO THE
MARKETS IN GENERAL OR TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ANY SPECIFIC TRADING PROGRAM WHICH
CANNOT BE FULLY ACCOUNTED FOR IN THE PREPARATION OF HYPOTHETICAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS
AND ALL OF WHICH CAN ADVERSELY AFFECT ACTUAL TRADING RESULTS. RESULTS NOT ADJUSTED
FOR COMMISSION AND SLIPPAGE.
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| Copyright © 1989- Moore Research Center, Inc. |
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| Some data provided by Commodity Research Bureau |
Upon evaluating the Best Equity Amount and Profit Amount columns, we see that 12 of the 15 years saw an open equity greater than the historical average profit and 10 of them closed out with equity greater than the average. This trade has been extremely consistent. This type of consistency would seem much more reliable than one which saw an open equity greater than the historical average in, for example, only 7 out of 15 years and which closed greater in only 5.
Interestingly enough, in this example two of the three years, which did not see
at least the historical average, resulted in losing trades. One (2000) never
had a closing profit at all, while the other (1986) peaked three days into the
trade and then failed. Looking at a chart, we see that the market did make one
attempt to rally but failed before selling off dramatically. The third year (1992)
deserves separate mention. This particular year saw significant early open
equity but then lost dramatically. We mention this separately because this was
the result of a one-time governmental intervention which directly devalued the
pound and which could not have been foreseen by historical research. Do your
homework! When you find catastrophic results like this, try to find out what
happened and why and then evaluate the probabilities of something similar
happening again. Attempt to analyze around the results. Do not forget about
them, as they are a potent reminder of how risky trading really is, but attempt
to exclude such extremes when evaluating practical stops.
Volatility
When discussing volatility in this particular instance, we're really talking
about comfort. Is this trade so wildly volatile that enormous drawdowns must be
suffered in the hope of ending with profits? Or can one sleep nights, enduring
an acceptable level of volatility (acceptable being relative for each individual,
of course). In this particular case, we attempted to optimize a protective stop
by evaluating every possible value from of $50 to $13,800 (1992's worst drawdown,
rounded up) in $50 increments. This stop optimization, shown in the
accompanying graph, resulted in an optimal stop of $1,750. (Note the dramatic
saw-tooth transitions as each year's worst drawdown is picked up and historical
profit increases until the next, with the peak amount showing up between the
drawdowns for winning and losing years.) Using $1,750 as a stop, this trade
would have succeeded in 11 of 15 years and raised the average annual return to
$1,933. So, by simply analyzing drawdown, one could have increased the average
annual return by over 30% with a only minor drop in winning trade percentage. In
addition, one could have
There are other methodologies for establishing personally acceptable risk. The primary concept is that it simply needs to be accomplished. One may not always be able to improve return while reducing risk, but the idea is to sleep better and play the game longer.
Conclusion
Finally, every seasonal trade is not for every trader. Account size limits ability to absorb risk as well as to diversify and to maintain multiple positions. Personal temperament determines one's emotional ability to accept risk, to weather drawdowns, and to "stay with the program." The amount of time available to monitor and evaluate markets also drives how selective a trader can and must be.
The purpose of this discussion has been to help traders with finite resources to evaluate and better select from among potential seasonal strategies to trade in real-time without, or at least before, analyzing current technical or fundamental conditions. Even the best analysts cannot see into the futures and predict what the market will do. Thus, taking the time well in advance to objectively evaluate the relative merits based on current margin requirements, rate of historical return, consistency of gain, and volatility of a group of seasonal strategies can make the difference between sleeping well, surviving, and prospering versus becoming only a spectator.
| *There is a risk of loss in futures trading. |
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