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Weekly Spread Commentary Sample

Crops & Shoulders

The primary function of a spread is to regulate supply and demand through time. The pricing mechanism can encourage consumption sooner rather than later or ensure supply for when needed most.

Consider soybeans. It can vary some by latitude, but the bulk of the US crop is planted May/June and harvested October/November. The USDA crop marketing year runs September-August. Because so few newly harvested soybeans are available for delivery against September CBOT futures, November is considered the first and most representative new-crop contract. In South America, Brazil harvests mostly April/May and Argentina (the larger exporter) May/June. Thus, CBOT May futures now most purely represent US old-crop soybeans because new South American supplies cannot transit in time for delivery --- making May/November Soybeans a pure US old-crop/new-crop spread.

The function of such a spread becomes obvious. If physical supplies are burdensome, then the contract for delivery sooner rather than later is more likely to trade at a discount in order to encourage more rather than less consumption and sooner rather than later. In contrast, when physical supplies are tight, that more nearby contract is more likely to trade at a premium in order to discourage consumption or delay it until the next crop is at least assured if not available.

Normally, old-crop soybeans weaken from the beginning of the new calendar year into February due to producer selling in the new tax year, logistical difficulties, an approaching seasonal decline in domestic soymeal consumption, and anticipated export competition from new South American harvests. Old-crop/new-crop spreads tend to follow lower. By early March, however, the market has usually discounted these pressures. With the crop marketing year now half over, far more than half last year's production has already been consumed. The remaining old-crop supplies must stretch until the next harvest --- still but a twinkle in producers' eyes. In the Midwest breadbasket, corn is planted first and, all else equal, preferably. Thus, soybeans often need to rally enough to "buy acreage" away from corn and to place a risk premium into price to compensate for the possibility of erratic weather.

This spring rally is usually led by old-crop, supplies of which will only get tighter. Higher old-crop prices tend to encourage acreage, thereby placing some pressure on new-crop prices. Thus, old-crop has usually outperformed new-crop from early March into May. For example, the Long May/Short November Soybeans spread has closed more favorably toward old-crop May on about April 18 than on about February 26 in 12 of the last 15 years --- suffering daily closing drawdown greater than 5.00 cents/bushel in only 4 years. (The CBOT requires minimum margin of $338. Brokers will accept spread orders.)

So far this year, large old-crop supplies and expectations for sharply reduced soybean acreage in favor corn (to meet ethanol demand) have conspired to drive this spread to as low so far as -38.25 cents/bushel. That was the biggest discount in May/November spreads since March-May 1983 (which, by the way, immediately preceded a major weather market that drove August Soybeans from under $6/bushel in late June to above $9 prior to expiry). The only two years in history in which discounts were wider (between -60 and -70 cents/bushel) were 1980-81, when soaring US interest rates sharply increased carrying charges.

With nearby soybeans at about $7.80/bushel, maximum CBOT storage premiums at about 4.50 cents/bushel/month, and the prime rate at 8.25%, full carry for this spread is now 63.00 cents/bushel ($7.80/bu x 0.0925/12 mo = 6.00 cents/bu/mo; 6.00 + 4.50 = 10.50 cents/bu/mo; 10.50 cents/bu/mo x 6 mo = 63.00). Thus, at current prices, the discount has a theoretical maximum of -63.00. Given that such discounts rarely exceed 80% of full carry, the more realistic maximum tradable discount would be -50.00. Thus, risk would appear to be minimal with potential for reward unlimited. Not to suggest it will do so this year, but note that the May/November 2004 version traded at a premium of almost +$3.00 before expiry.

The USDA Forum is scheduled for March 1-2, from whence will come estimates for corn and soybean acreage. Will and, if so, when will bullish speculators forced to liquidate March futures prior to First Notice Day to avoid deliveries reinstate those positions in May or July? For chart aficionados who prefer to buy breakouts from trading ranges, this spread has been unable to narrow within -34.00 for six weeks now.

More adventuresome traders might consider natural gas. Retail consumption expands during winter's heating season and again during summer's cooling season. Periods in between each, when consumption contracts, are known as "shoulder months." The heating season ends with March, and the cooling season --- when gas is used to generate electricity to run air conditioning --- begins again with June. Thus, April and May constitute spring's shoulder months.

But that is also a period of transition. With total national inventories normally near annual lows, selling is muted but distributors in hot-weather regions need to accumulate inventory to meet retail demand during peak cooling season. But timing can be everything. Natural gas is a market whose price structure tends to place greater premium into months of higher consumption.

For example, even as consumption usually is low in April, those inventories need to be growing into May. Thus, as soon as April becomes lead contract, cold-weather distributors with excess supply may sell into it whereas hot-weather distributors are beginning to price supply for delivery in May and beyond. So May futures usually outperform April during the first several days of March. In fact, the Long May/Short April Natural Gas spread has closed more favorably toward May on about March 11 than on about February 28 in 14 of the last 15 years --- suffering no daily closing drawdown whatsoever in 9 of those years, and none greater than $0.018/mmBtu. (The minimum increment of $0.001/mmBtu is worth $10.00. NYMEX requires minimum margin of $1,350 in this volatile market. Work closely with your broker on placing any orders because execution can be, ahem, "difficult.")

This year's spread has generally favored May from a discount most of last year all the way into early January, when it reached its so far peak premium of +$0.110/mmBtu. The spread then narrowed back toward even money but held late in the month at 0.020. By mid February it had widened back to as much as 0.093 before pulling back modestly. The spread has been coiling between January's high and its low, with February's low so far at 0.045. The April contract will be front month upon March's expiry on February 26.

The CRB Index appears to be trying to break upward again.

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Please remember: These are NOT trading recommendations. They are intended only as potential ideas based on the market's own performance in the past, but past performance is not necessarily indicative of future results. Futures trading involves substantial risk of loss.

If you have any questions or comments, e-mail me or call me directly at 541-484-7256.

Trade 'em

Jerry Toepke

SEASONAL TENDENCIES ARE A COMPOSITE OF SOME OF THE MORE CONSISTENT COMMODITY FUTURES SEASONALS THAT HAVE OCCURRED OVER THE PAST 15 YEARS. THERE ARE USUALLY UNDERLYING FUNDAMENTAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT OCCUR ANNUALLY THAT TEND TO CAUSE THE FUTURES MARKETS TO REACT IN A SIMILAR DIRECTIONAL MANNER DURING A CERTAIN CALENDAR PERIOD OF THE YEAR. EVEN IF A SEASONAL TENDENCY OCCURS IN THE FUTURE, IT MAY NOT RESULT IN A PROFITABLE TRANSACTION AS FEES, AND THE TIMING OF THE ENTRY AND LIQUIDATION MAY IMPACT ON THE RESULTS. NO REPRESENTATION IS BEING MADE THAT ANY ACCOUNT HAS IN THE PAST OR WILL IN THE FUTURE ACHIEVE PROFITS UTILIZING THESE STRATEGIES. NO REPRESENTATION IS BEING MADE THAT PRICE PATTERNS WILL RECUR IN THE FUTURE. HYPOTHETICAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS HAVE MANY INHERENT LIMITATIONS, SOME OF WHICH ARE DESCRIBED BELOW. NO REPRESENTATION IS BEING MADE THAT ANY ACCOUNT WILL OR IS LIKELY TO ACHIEVE PROFITS OR LOSSES SIMILAR TO THOSE SHOWN. IN FACT, THERE ARE FREQUENTLY SHARP DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HYPOTHETICAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS AND THE ACTUAL RESULTS SUBSEQUENTLY ACHIEVED BY ANY PARTICULAR TRADING PROGRAM. ONE OF THE LIMITATIONS OF HYPOTHETICAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS IS THAT THEY ARE GENERALLY PREPARED WITH THE BENEFIT OF HINDSIGHT. IN ADDITION, HYPOTHETICAL TRADING DOES NOT INVOLVE FINANCIAL RISK, AND NO HYPOTHETICAL TRADING RECORD CAN COMPLETELY ACCOUNT FOR THE IMPACT OF FINANCIAL RISK IN ACTUAL TRADING. FOR EXAMPLE, THE ABILITY TO WITHSTAND LOSSES OR ADHERE TO A PARTICULAR TRADING PROGRAM IN SPITE OF TRADING LOSSES ARE MATERIAL POINTS WHICH CAN ALSO ADVERSELY AFFECT ACTUAL TRADING RESULTS. THERE ARE NUMEROUS OTHER FACTORS RELATED TO THE MARKETS IN GENERAL OR TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ANY SPECIFIC TRADING PROGRAM WHICH CANNOT BE FULLY ACCOUNTED FOR IN THE PREPARATION OF HYPOTHETICAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS AND ALL OF WHICH CAN ADVERSELY AFFECT ACTUAL TRADING RESULTS. RESULTS NOT ADJUSTED FOR COMMISSION AND SLIPPAGE.

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